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ABSTRACT  19 
 20 
This article explores the importance of peasant farming worldwide, the debate about its 21 
disappearance and the way it is being impacted by differentiated policies. It takes two 22 
examples, Tunisia and Egypt, during post-colonial times. In both cases policies tended to 23 
favour the modernization of agriculture, ignoring the contribution of peasant farming to the 24 
national economies. But interestingly the data show a surprisingly significant importance 25 
and increase in the number of small farms in both countries. While theoretical debates 26 
continue about the disappearance of peasantries, reality demonstrates that peasant 27 
farming is a formidable and resilient buffer for human societies, which helps stabilize, 28 
balance and enrich them. 29 
 30 
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  35 
Introduction 36 
 37 
The debate about the place of peasant farming in human societies remains more 38 
relevant than ever. A number of grey areas persist as to what peasant farming actually 39 
is. We have chosen here to explore and analyze how peasant communities have 40 
reacted to a series of differentiated policies during four decades from the sixties to the 41 
nineties in two countries, Tunisia and Egypt, to try to understand how these policies 42 
have impacted peasant communities on the field, and which coping mechanisms have 43 
been developed. This is with a view to increasing the available knowledge about this 44 
form of agriculture, to better understand how it compares to other forms of farming 45 
and to explore how it has contributed to national economies. The lessons learned serve 46 
as a powerful instrument that can inform future policies. 47 
Before entering the analysis per se, we briefly say a few words about the importance 48 
of peasant farming worldwide and about the debate on the forecasted disappearance of 49 
peasantries in modern societies. 50 
 51 
Peasant farming is present all around the world 52 
 53 
Though official statistics do not record peasant farming as such, figures on small farms have 54 
been used to understand its importance and distribution. Beginning in 1950, the FAO World 55 
Programme for the Census of Agriculture (WCA) has been supporting countries to carry out 56 
their national agricultural census, using standard international concepts, definitions and 57 
methodologies. These data were analyzed in previous works (Hilmi, 2012), over three 58 
decades, 1970–2000, and have shown that there has been an increase of 91 percent of the 59 
number of small farms under 2 ha during this period of time, and that small farms represent 60 
85 percent of all the farms of the world. The very small farms are usually not recorded in the 61 
statistical census, which means that the importance of peasant farming is even higher than 62 
what is recorded in the statistics. 63 
 64 
In addition, numerous organizations (ETC Group, 2009; IAASTD, 2009; UNEP, 2011; 65 
Development Fund, 2011; HLPE, 2013) have written about the importance of small food 66 
producers, including peasants, producing 70 percent of the world’s foods, with 80 percent 67 
being consumed locally. Beyond food, another characteristic of peasant farming is the 68 
provision of labour. The World Agriculture Census reports reflect systematically, over the 69 
years, the fact that farms remain a large source of employment. For example, China in the 70 
2000 WCA, reports 519 million household members engaged in agriculture on 193 million 71 
holdings with 800 million persons, an average of 2.7 household members per farm, with 72 
each household composed of four persons. 73 
 74 
The debate about the permanence or disappearance of peasants continues today 75 
 76 
While figures demonstrate that peasants remain present in all the countries of the world, 77 
and that their number is increasing, a dominant paradigm, since the 1970s, has been one of 78 
modernization, with the idea that peasants would gradually be replaced by farmers, 79 
understood as agricultural entrepreneurs. The debate about disappearance of the 80 
peasantries, or otherwise, is not a recent one. It has been going on for decades, and has 81 
been the centre of heated debate in the development fora especially during the 1980s. A 82 
brief overview of the literature helps understand how it has been unfolding. 83 
 84 
The importance of peasants was recognized early on in the literature. Peasants are referred 85 
to as the ‘silent and invisible world that exist below the market economy’ (Braudel, 1967). 86 
Chayanov (1925) predicted a ‘shift of power into peasant hands’. Significant works (Thomas 87 
and Znaniecki, 1918; Thorner, 1956; Wolf, 1969) in empirical sociology, history, 88 
anthropology, economics have shown their importance, struggles and forms of resistance 89 
across centuries and continents, with differing views on the ways subaltern people resist 90 
dominance (Scott, 1976; Popkin, 1979). 91 
 92 
Starting in the seventies, and as part of the modernization paradigm, the issue of the 93 
disappearance of the peasantry was debated, with the implicit idea that the natural process 94 
of modernization would transform agriculture into industrial farming, and that subsistence 95 
farming would gradually recede. Thus the ‘death of peasantry’ or depeasantization was 96 
predicted (Hobsbawm, 1994; Bryceson, 1999) with the idea of development as a necessary 97 
process, and as a matter of ordered social reform, that removed dysfunctional elements, 98 
included in which was the peasantry (Hoogvelt, 2001). Discrepancies on the definitions kept 99 
the debate alive, with those arguing that the peasant way of life would continue despite 100 
increased urbanization (Johnson, 2004), or lack of direct ownership (Araghi, 1995), and that 101 
its permanence is due to the fact that the peasant mode of production is geared to the 102 
satisfaction of family needs and not to profit per se, a radical distinction to the capitalistic 103 
form of production (Bernstein, 2000). Overall, the commonly implicit and accepted idea, 104 
already present in the works of Marx and Engels, however was that, for civilization to 105 
progress, the peasantry must dissolve, as society moves from a traditional to a modern 106 
state. This view has largely influenced development theorists and the national and regional 107 
policies that derived. 108 
 109 
More recently, the construction of peasant theory (Ploeg, 2008) brings back a Chayanovian 110 
perspective on peasants and takes the debate to a radically new direction with the 111 
understanding of the fundamental differences between the peasant way of farming (based 112 
upon the sustainable use of ecological capital) and other modes of agricultural production, 113 
i.e. entrepreneurial agriculture (built upon financial and industrial capital-credit, industrial 114 
inputs, technologies) which aims at increasing profit and corporate or capitalist farming 115 
(which follows an agro-export model). Peasant agriculture is understood as a struggle for 116 
autonomy in a context of dependency relations and marginalization. Peasant farming as 117 
self-controlled and managed resource base (including land) allows for co-production with 118 
living nature, and interaction with the market. A form of farming that feeds back into 119 
strengthening the resource base: what is produced returns to the farm or is sold in the 120 
market. Its primary aim is livelihoods, and it embeds many functions beyond food. 121 
Whenever possible, it is the family that owns, or has user rights on the land and other 122 
means of production, and the family members who work on the farm. 123 
 124 
Thus, new theory, and a contemporary perspective on repeasantization, has contributed to 125 
pushing aside the previous idea of disappearance, but the word ‘peasant’ remains heavily 126 
loaded with negative connotations and preconceptions. Science itself has often contributed 127 
to making peasant farming invisible, bringing forward an ideal model of what the 128 
agricultural entrepreneur should be, and obscuring the way in which peasants do operate 129 
today in the countryside. 130 
 131 
Building on the above, we propose to look closer into how peasant communities do operate, 132 
and into the way they have reacted to the waves of different public policies, resisting or 133 
moving along, to see the role they play in our societies. Particular to this analysis is the fact 134 
that, more often than not, policymakers don’t know about, or, have a conscious, or 135 
unconscious prejudice against the peasant way of farming, inherited from the mental lock-in 136 
of the 1970s, framed within the modernization paradigm. Thus, what we will see here, is the 137 
positive or negative unexpected spin-offs on peasant communities, rather than the impact 138 
of planned proactive strategies dedicated to peasants. This will be of particular interest in 139 
that it allows us to learn from what unfolds in the countries, from the impacts that arise 140 
sometimes despite policies and from the reactions of communities themselves: A perfect 141 
laboratory for reflecting on new paths for the future. 142 
 143 
Tunisia and Egypt from the 1960s to the 1990s, two opposed evolutions grounded in the 144 
same reality 145 
 146 
Tunisia and Egypt have been chosen as comparable, but also distinct territories, in terms of 147 
geographies and histories, both countries having very clear examples of policy impacts on 148 
their peasant communities. The period of time is chosen here as illustrative of an interesting 149 
set of clear-cut differentiated waves of policies, often contradictory in their essence, that 150 
reflect the world politics of the time: post-colonial policies, liberal and proindustrialization 151 
policies, structural adjustment programmes, integrated rural development and agrarian law. 152 
These waves unfold differently in these two countries, and it is these very differences that 153 
will inform our analysis. 154 
 155 
Tunisia, an economy boosted by the increase in the number of small farms 156 
 157 
In Tunisia, in 1996, the Ministry of Agriculture published the results of the national 1994–158 
1995 census, and was puzzled about the exceptional increase in the number of holdings (44 159 
percent) since 1962, and the fact that this increase was, for 90 percent of the cases, for 160 
farms under 5 hectares. In the meantime, total population doubled (from 4.2 to 8.7 million) 161 
and the land available per person declined from 1.2 to 0.6 ha. Research works (Abaab and 162 
Elloumi, 2001) find that despite the increase in the number of holdings, Tunisian agriculture 163 
performed exceptionally well. What happened? Let us backtrack into the years before. 164 
 165 
1960–1969 is the time of imposed cooperatives and agriculture as the motor of the national 166 
economy. The idea was to bring together small and big producers on large holdings 167 
recovered from colonial land and modernize agriculture to finance national development. 168 
The process was a top-down authoritarian one to which peasants reacted with hostility. The 169 
result was policies that favoured large holdings and a dismantlement of subsistence farming 170 
followed by a migration wave of landless farmers to the cities and abroad (essentially France 171 
and Germany). During those years, peasant farming was squeezed, and peasants were 172 
evicted from their lands. 173 
 174 
In the 1970s, with industry as motor of the national economy, acknowledging the failure of 175 
the previous decade, the government opened to international markets. Prices of food were 176 
low, inputs subsidized, investments encouraged with delivery of credit conditional to the 177 
adoption of modern technology. Large holdings were favoured and production modernized. 178 
Small farms were again marginalized, with credit and technologies inaccessible for 179 
smallholders. Migrations of peasants expanded further to other European and Arab 180 
countries. 181 
 182 
With the 1980s came the structural adjustment policies. The country could no longer 183 
subsidize inputs to produce cheap food. The financial crisis deepened and reached the 184 
industrial sector. The situation worsened with the border restrictions which affected the 185 
incoming of remittances coming from abroad. Structural adjustment policies had the effect 186 
to further dismantling social safety nets. 187 
 188 
Alarmed by the deterioration of living conditions and the rapid increase of poverty rates in 189 
both rural and urban context, public authorities took a radical U-turn, and reoriented 190 
development policies towards rural territories. The next ten years were dedicated to the 191 
implementation of integrated rural development programmes (road infrastructure, 192 
transport, drinking water, electrification, etc.). Rural areas became attractive and the 193 
migration movement was reversed, as, in contrast, industrial as well as overseas 194 
opportunities diminished. This was the time of the return of peasants to their home villages 195 
and a wave of newcomers to the countryside, benefitting from new opportunities and 196 
better living conditions. 197 
 198 
As a result, between the end of the 1980s and the years 2000, the poverty rate decreased 199 
from 13 to 4.2 percent, with 36.4 percent of the population living in rural areas. Poverty rate 200 
in rural areas became half that of urban area (National Statistics Institute 2000 data). 201 
Pluriactivity of heads of farm holdings remained high (43 percent) reflecting a high level of 202 
articulation with the rest of the economy. Family labour became available on farm (more 203 
than 1.1 million family members participating to farming activities). Investment increased, 204 
mainly in the form of auto-financing (only 7.5 percent of farmers requested credit). 205 
 206 
The case of Tunisia is particularly interesting in that it demonstrates a series of action–207 
reaction attitudes of peasant communities to the national policies imposed upon them. 208 
Firstly, we can see that peasants have no say in those policies, but that they are directly 209 
impacted by them. Secondly, we realize that depending on the types of policies, these 210 
alternatively marginalize or encourage peasant farming, somehow by default, so to say, as 211 
these policies are not geared to peasant farming per se, but to the growth of national 212 
economy. This is done firstly by policymaking geared to agricultural growth (large holdings 213 
inherited from colonial times), then by industrial development, later by applying the 214 
structural adjustment, and finally taking a U-turn towards improving infrastructure in the 215 
rural areas. Under these contradictory waves that have pushed them back and forth within 216 
the country and abroad, peasants have resisted and adapted, using a range of coping 217 
strategies including labour in the industrial sector, intensification and diversification on 218 
farm, auto-financing, pluriactivity and migration abroad. There is a recurrent theme 219 
underlying the governmental policies since the sixties, and that is modernization and the 220 
favouring of large holdings. This explains the surprise at the outcome of the national 221 
statistics that showed a concomitant increase in the number of small farms while at the 222 
same time the national economic indicators improved and poverty was reduced. This is due 223 
to the significant shift that happened in the 1980s with a clear focus on developing rural 224 
territories with a resulting reversed migration towards rural areas which then became more 225 
attractive than the cities. The agricultural sector performs exceptionally well and our 226 
interpretation is that this is thanks to, and not despite, the increase of the number of small 227 
holdings. 228 
 229 
Egypt, policies that dismantle the most efficient farming systems in the world 230 
 231 
If we now look into the case of Egypt, during the same period of time, a 1990 census shows 232 
that 99.9 percent of the farms are family farms concentred on the Nile Valley. Most of the 233 
land is cultivated by the owner or leaser and by his/her family members. A study 234 
undertaken in the 1990s (Roudart, 2001) shows that 78 percent of the farms are under 1.26 235 
ha and 36 percent even less than 0.42 ha. The mean size is 0.5 ha. These small-sized 236 
holdings have been able to produce enough food to cover the needs of a population close to 237 
60 million. An astounding record. How did this happen? 238 
 239 
The agrarian systems of the Nile Valley are a model of intensive agriculture which reaches 240 
productivity levels beyond the highest world records (FAOSTAT, 1990): 5.7 tons per ha for 241 
wheat, 7.4 tons per ha for maize, 8.4 tons per ha for rice in 1995–1998; 6.4 tons per ha, 7.9 242 
tons per ha and 10 tons, respectively, in 2009, higher than the yields of the Netherlands, 243 
France and the USA during the same period of time. In addition, the total output per 244 
hectare in this multicrop systems is higher than any monoculture systems and is 245 
characterized by a high level of diversity in terms of crops, fruit trees and animals per unit of 246 
land. These farming systems are based on the intensification practices, the renewal of soil 247 
fertility and the use of small-scale machinery used on collective basis (for soil preparation, 248 
water pumping, grain threshing, etc.), with a mean of one tractor per 26 ha (FAOSTAT, 249 
1990), as compared to one tractor per 48 ha in France or one per 90 ha in the US. 250 
Depending on the soil qualities, a plot of 0.5–1.3 ha is sufficient to sustain a family and to 251 
prepare for the following farming cycle. 252 
 253 
Starting in 1992, a radical change occurs. The 1992 agrarian law (Land Law N. 96) tripled the 254 
price of leases, and on 6 October 1997, the land market was liberalized, a change of policy 255 
that lead to the collapse of this extraordinarily intensive systems built over millennia. All 256 
leases were abruptly terminated, bringing to an end the security of tenure, a fundamental 257 
right under the Nasser 1952 agrarian reform law which had made possible these uniquely 258 
efficient farming systems. With the 1952 law, the Nasser government had protected the 259 
landless farmers and small producers with sharecropping rules favourable to the tenants, 260 
securing rights through lifetime leases which could be transmitted to the descendants. This 261 
translated into 430.000 farmers who were full tenants (rent or sharecropping) and 470.000 262 
who had a mixed tenancy with only a part under direct ownership. The abrupt termination 263 
of these leases lead to massive street riots which were harshly repressed. Farmers who lost 264 
their access rights, were instead offered plots of land in the Sinai desert. Policy authorities 265 
justified this necessary change by the need to modernize agriculture, and to put land into 266 
the capital markets (assuming that land offer would increase, and prices drop). Instead, the 267 
land market became paralyzed and the lands were degraded by the interruption of long-268 
term renewal of soil fertility. Labour arrangements became precarious, leases shortened 269 
and became insecure discouraging long-term investments. Further studies reflected a 270 
deterioration of the standards of living (Saber, 2006). 271 
 272 
The case of Egypt shows something that very few people are aware of. That is that the 273 
evolution of the farming systems in the Nile Valley has produced the most efficient farming 274 
systems in the world, with yields exceeding those of the most industrialized countries. We 275 
are not talking here about labour productivity, a mistake often leading to misinterpretation, 276 
but of productivity per unit of land or labour object (cow, etc.). It is of course known that 277 
the Nile Valley was fertile, with its renowned silts, but less known is that the rights system, 278 
social, labour, assets (land, animals and machinery) rights inherited from the Nasser times, 279 
was amongst the most modern of the world, which in addition, and totally ignored by the 280 
scientific community, was a risk-sharing mechanism for investment with shareholding 281 
informal agreements (payments in the form of percentage of harvest, flexible enough to 282 
allow the renewal of the means of production each coming year), based on the Arabic 283 
system. In effect, grounded on religious beliefs, the Arab societies forbid the receiving of 284 
interest rates and have developed other informal systems based on trust and reciprocity for 285 
investment, thus avoiding the excessive indebtedness that occurs elsewhere as a major 286 
bottleneck to investment in small holdings. A third fundamental component of this success, 287 
in addition to ecological intensification in farming, and access to means and investment, is 288 
the mix and balance of individual and collective work. Farmers work on their individual plots 289 
of land, and share sophisticated social collective arrangements for the use of water and 290 
maintenance of water canals, and the use of small mechanization, thus attaining the most 291 
efficient production systems in an ever-evolving fashion. 292 
 293 
Again here, as in the case of Tunisia, we have policies that do not take into account the 294 
peasant way of farming per se, and which stem from the modernization paradigm with the 295 
idea that agricultural profit is obtained through the use of financial and industrial capital, 296 
and where land is seen as a financial asset comparable to any other. The reality on the 297 
ground has demonstrated that the land market, when liberalized, does not work as 298 
expected, and instead the market freezes with social actors preferring to keep the land even 299 
when idle. Critical in this case is to witness the effects of the dismantlement of the rights 300 
access, a fundamental pillar of peasant farming, with the effect of social degradation, 301 
poverty increase and the loss of long-term environmental sustainability as the renewal of 302 
soil fertility is no longer insured. 303 
 304 
Discussion: when peasant farming plays a buffer role for national economies 305 
 306 
The analysis of these two countries shows some common characteristics: in both Tunisia 307 
and Egypt, peasant farming has contributed to producing food for the rural and urban 308 
populations, and has been a buffer against adversity. When policies have provided an 309 
enabling environment, such as land security or integrated rural development, the effect has 310 
been less poverty, more social cohesion and intensification of production. In these two 311 
countries we have opposed movements grounded on the same dynamics. In one case, 312 
Tunisia, peasants alternatively resist (forced cooperatives, structural adjustment) and thrive 313 
(territory and rural development); on the other side, Egypt, peasants prosper (Nasser 1952 314 
land tenure legislation and struggle (1992 Land Law N.96)). These changes have long-term 315 
consequences on the natural resources (water and soil management). In both cases the 316 
dominant discourse from public authorities has been one of modernization of agriculture, 317 
failing to acknowledge the role of peasant farming, as contributing to the nation’s 318 
prosperity. There is an intellectual lock-in about the negative perception of the peasant 319 
figure in societies, still considered backward, unproductive and meant to disappear.  320 
 321 
In these examples, and more particularly in Egypt, there is an inability to realize the fact that 322 
peasants are able to produce in abundance. Peasant farming is often equated to poverty. 323 
But if we return the equation, we realize that while peasant farming can be practiced in 324 
difficult areas where other forms of agriculture fail to take place (steep hills, remote areas, 325 
marginal lands, etc.), it can also favourably strive compared to other forms of agriculture 326 
when good conditions avail. Hence, peasant farming is not identical to the often assumed 327 
distribution of poverty. The places where intensification is blocked are not intrinsic to 328 
peasant farming, on the contrary, as we have observed in Egypt, peasant farming produces 329 
the highest total amount of gross value added, not only because the total production per 330 
unit of area is higher, but also because gross value added represents a larger part of gross 331 
value produced, as peasants are less dependent on outside inputs, thus generating more 332 
income. At the level of the country as is demonstrated in Tunisia, this translates into an 333 
increase of the agricultural contribution to the national economy and an increase of the 334 
national wealth (as reported by national statistics on the increase of small farms and 335 
positive indicators on agricultural production). 336 
 337 
The coping strategies observed in both cases show that peasant farming plays the role of 338 
buffer and catalyst for national economies both when conditions deteriorate and when 339 
conditions are favourable. A key consideration, often ignored, is that peasant farming is a 340 
formidable cradle for labour. When unemployment hits, people find opportunities for 341 
employment and livelihoods in the countryside. Farmers who left the land, having had to 342 
migrate for one reason or the other, maintain the link and return to their land or village, 343 
when conditions improve. The same applies for the newcomers, new peasants, in search of 344 
better life conditions and a livelihood in the rural areas. 345 
 346 
Conclusion 347 
 348 
To conclude, what we learn from the analysis of these two case studies is that when 349 
conditions avail (integrated approaches, security of tenure) intensity of farming brings high 350 
productivity per unit of land, and even very small plots can sustain a family and provide a 351 
decent life, while at the same time insuring the next production cycle. Secure access, as well 352 
as social and labour rights, is a key prerequisite to allow for the potential of value creation 353 
to be unleashed. Farming can only be understood in the long term as it deals with living 354 
systems (above and below ground) that take long time to be established. In addition, a 355 
complementarity of individual and collective approaches is the most efficient combination 356 
for agricultural production, and, land does not work as other assets in the capital markets. 357 
 358 
When we look at four decades of policies in Tunisia and Egypt we can marvel at the 359 
resilience of the peasant way of farming. Waves of migrations within or outside the 360 
countries have accompanied contradictory policies unfolding during these different stages. 361 
In every case, peasant communities have played a buffer role, able to alternatively absorb 362 
newcomers (when poverty hits in town) and to provide labour to the other sectors of the 363 
economy when being marginalized and struggling to compete against facilities provided to 364 
the large holdings to which they have no access. It would be interesting for policymakers to 365 
reframe future policies taking into account what these field examples show and to imagine 366 
what could be the contribution of peasant farming to human societies if there were policies 367 
that would be directly dedicated to this form of agriculture: A new challenge to embrace for 368 
the future. 369 
 370 
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